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Among the many contextually sensitive expressions in natural language, some have
conventional context independent meanings that are such that when the expression is
placed in a context, its conventional context independent meaning by itself suffices to
secure a semantic value for the expression relative to that context. ‘I’ is the paradigm
here. Some think ‘today’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and other expressions are of this sort as well.
Following established usage, call such expressions pure indexicals. I bring up pure
indexicals only to make clear that I will not be concerned with them here.
Other sorts of contextually sensitive expressions are such that their context inde-
pendent conventional meanings need to be in some way supplemented in context for
the expressions to secure semantic values in those contexts. As we will see, it is not
clear that there is a paradigm here, but ‘he’ used demonstratively is a clear example of
such an expression. Call expressions of this sort supplementives in order to highlight
the fact that their context independent meanings need to be supplemented in context
for them to have semantic values relative to the context.
Many philosophers and linguists think that there is a lot of contextual sensitivity
in natural language that goes well beyond the pure indexicals and supplementives
like ‘he’. Constructions/expressions that are good candidates for being contextually
sensitive include: quantifiers (via “quantifier domains” being fixed in context); grad-
able adjectives (‘tall’, ‘smart’, etc.), including “predicates of personal taste” (‘tasty’,
‘fun’); modals; conditionals; possessives (‘Annie’s book’); and relational expressions
 There is a serious question as to whether any expression other than ‘I’ is a pure indexical. Even ‘now’,
‘today’, and so on can have their “extents” varied in context. Consider ‘I am talking now.’ versus ‘People used
to watch television shows exclusively on their televisions sets, but now they are just as likely to watch them
on their computers.’ It would appear that the “extent” designated by ‘now’ differs in these two sentences on
their natural interpretations. It doesn’t appear that this can be explained solely by reference to the context
independent meaning of ‘now’. So this at least casts doubt on the claim that ‘now’ is a pure indexical the
way I am using the term.
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taking implicit arguments (‘ready’, ‘enemy’, ‘finish’). It would appear that in none of
these cases does the expression/construction in question have a context independent
meaning that when placed in context suffices to secure a semantic value for the
expression/construction in the context. In each case, some sort of supplementation
is required to do this. Hence, all these expressions are supplementives in my sense.
For a given supplementive, the question arises as to what themechanism is for sup-
plementing its conventionalmeanings in context so as to secure a semantic value for it
in context.That is, what form does the supplementation take?The question also arises
as to whether different supplementives require different kinds of supplementation.
Following Michael Glanzberg (), let us call an account of what, in addition to
its conventional meaning, secures a semantic value for a supplementive in context a
metasemantics for that supplementive. So we can put our two questions thus: what is
the proper metasemantics for a given supplementive; and do all supplementives have
the same metasemantics (of course the answer to the second question will fall out of
answering the first question for all supplementives)?
In King (), I considered a special case of supplementives—demonstratives (i.e.
second and third person pronouns, as well as single and plural simple (‘that’) and
complex (‘that girl’) demonstratives)—and proposed ametasemantics for them. I sug-
gested in that paper that my metasemantics plausibly applies to all supplementives.
But I did not pursue the matter there and left it as a reasonable hypothesis, though
I knew there were various difficulties that would have to be addressed.
Subsequently, I came across an illuminating paper by Michael Glanzberg ()
in which he argues that there are two importantly different sorts of supplementives
(which Glanzberg calls parameters). Overall, I find Glanzberg’s argument convincing.
However, one of his arguments that there are two different kinds of supplementives is
that the two kinds are governed by different metasemantics. Obviously, if Glanzberg
is right about this, the metasemantics I proposed for demonstratives in King ()
cannot apply to all supplementives.
In the present work, I propose, first, to sketch the metasemantics I formulated for
demonstratives in King (). Next, I will briefly consider a number of other sup-
plementives that I think the metasemantics I propose plausibly applies to and explain
why I think that. Finally, I will consider three arguments that Glanzberg gives to the
effect that supplementives are governed by two different metasemantics, and attempt
to respond to them. In each case, Glanzberg argues that certain supplementives are
not governed by the sort of metasemantics I proposed for demonstratives, though
Glanzberg does think my sort of metasemantics applies to some supplementives,
including demonstratives. As I suggest above, even if my responses to Glanzberg
are successful, I do not think this undermines the central conclusion of his paper;
and there is a sense in which I may leave Glanzberg much of what is important to
him even with respect to his claims about the metasemantics of supplementives. In
any case, though I do not claim to show here that my metasemantics applies to all
supplementives I think there is a good case that it applies to a large number. Further, I
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highlight one important sort of worry about whether my account applies to all cases,
and suggest strategies for dealing with cases that initially appear to cause trouble for
my account.Whether these strategies can handle all recalcitrant cases is unclear tome.
The best way to introduce and motivate my view is by considering the deficiencies
of other views. Let us begin with the metasemantics for demonstratives given in
Kaplan (). Kaplan held that demonstratives require an associated demonstra-
tion. The requirement was enforced by what Kaplan called “the linguistic rules”;
and a demonstrative without an associated demonstration was held by Kaplan to
be “incomplete.” Presumably when Kaplan talks of the “linguistic rules” requiring
that a demonstration accompanies each use of a demonstrative, he means that it is
part of the lexical semantics of demonstratives that they require supplementation by
a demonstration. A complete demonstrative in context refers to the thing that the
demonstration demonstrates. Thus, for Kaplan (), it is the demonstration that
determines a semantic value for a demonstrative in context. Call this metasemantics
the demonstration account.
Kaplan himself recognized that the demonstration account has various problems.
Of course, the demonstration account requires that any time a demonstrative has
a semantic value in context, that value was secured by a demonstration. The first
problem is that in many cases it simply isn’t clear what a demonstration is on this
account. Kaplan writes:
However, a demonstrationmay also be opportune and require no special action on the speaker’s
part, as when someone shouts “Stop that man” while only one man is rushing toward the door.
My notion of a demonstration is a theoretical concept. I do not, in the present work, undertake
a detailed ‘operational’ analysis of this notion, although there are scattered remarks relevant to
the issue. (:  fn. )
The speaker in this case clearly does secure a semantic value for his demonstrative in
context. But what is supposed to be the demonstration that does so in such a case?
It is quite unclear. There are other cases where it is, if anything, less clear what the
demonstration is supposed to be. Your father, to whom you were very close, has just
died. You used to attend New York Giant games together, and we both know that
I know this. I am sitting with you when an ad for Giant tickets comes on television
and I see a pained look on your face. I say: ‘I know you miss him.’ and succeed in
referring to your father. Again here it is hard to know how to think of the alleged
demonstration. So for the advocate of the demonstration account, there are many,
many cases in which it just isn’t clear what the demonstration is. But then the demon-
stration account doesn’t really tell us what secures the value of a demonstrative in
 I actually don’t want the demonstration account to entail that demonstratives refer since I
argue that simple and complex demonstratives are not referring expressions in King (), and
I want the demonstration account to be consistent with my semantics for simple and complex demon-
stratives. The demonstration account holds only that the supplementation required by demonstratives, by
means of which they acquire values in context, is a demonstration.
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context in such cases. Further, I am skeptical about the possibility of formulating a
notion of demonstration that is general enough to capture all the cases discussed so
far, while excluding cases in which even the demonstration theorist will want to say
that there was no demonstration.
A second difficulty, noted by Kaplan (), is that in many cases a demonstration
will be vague in the sense that there is not a unique thing clearly being demonstrated.
An example would be a wave of the hand in the general direction of a child, a bike
and a surfboard as I utter ‘That is for big waves.’ Here it does not seem as though
the demonstration alone secured a value for the demonstrative, contrary to what the
demonstration account claims.
A final difficulty, again pointed out by Kaplan (), is that even if I focus my
pointing with laser-like precision on my friend Dan and say ‘He is a real estate agent’,
I am pointing not only at Dan, but at his shirt, his jacket, perhaps a button, etc. So here
again, my demonstration—the pointing—does not seem as though it alone secures a
value for the demonstrative in context.
As is well known, Kaplan changed his mind about what secures a value for a
demonstrative in a context. In Kaplan (), he claimed that “at least in the case of
perceptual demonstratives” what he called the “directing intention” (he also calls it the
“perceptual intention” (: )) of the speaker fixes the value of the demonstrative.
Presumably, by “perceptual demonstratives,” Kaplan means those that are used to talk
about something the speaker is perceiving. The idea, then, is that when a speaker is
perceiving an object and forms the intention to talk about it bymeans of a demonstra-
tive, the value of the demonstrative the speaker produces in such a case is the object
the speaker intends to talk about. Call this metasemantics the intention account.
The intention account has a number of difficulties. One problem with evaluating
the account is that nothing has been said about how the values of non-perceptual
demonstratives are secured in context (see Reimer ). But let’s just waive this
problem for the moment. For the intention account has a more serious difficulty: the
intention account seems very strained in cases in which a speaker has the relevant
intention but mounts either a poor demonstration or no demonstration. For example,
suppose I am at the San Clemente Ocean Festival (“The greatest show on surf!”)
standing on the pier looking north.Thousands of people are in sight. I fixmy attention
on a competitor in the mile swim off in the distance getting ready for the event and,
intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely to the north, say ‘She looks like a
strong swimmer.’ You, of course, have no idea whom I am talking about. It seems quite
implausible in such a case to say that I succeeded in securing the woman in question
as the value of my demonstrative simply because I was perceiving her, and intending
to talk about her. Or consider Reimer’s () example of two people in a park filled
with dogs, one of which the speaker recognizes as her dog Fido. Focusing on Fido and
intending to talk about him, she says ‘That dog is Fido.’ without producing any sort of
demonstration (no pointing, nodding, glancing, etc.) due to a sudden andmomentary
paralysis. Again, it does not seem as though the speaker succeeds in securing Fido as
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the value of her demonstrative in such a case. But she should have if the intention
account were correct.
The difficulties noted with the intention and demonstration accounts have inclined
some to combine them. Kaplan () suggested such a view. Motivated in part by
the second and third difficulties with the demonstration account discussed above,
Kaplan suggests allowing the intended demonstratum to play a role in securing the
value of a demonstrative in context “within limits.” Kaplan doesn’t make clear exactly
what those limits are. But it is clear that he wants to allow speaker intentions to
play a role in securing the value of a demonstrative in context in cases where the
demonstration mounted is too vague to do the job itself (e.g. I wave my hand in the
general direction of the intended object, where there are other objects in the vicinity).
He also wants to invoke intentions to make it the case that when I say ‘That is a nice
dog’, pointing at Fido, his coat and a flea on his coat, it is Fido who gets to be the value
of my demonstrative in virtue of my intention to talk about him and not his coat or
the flea. Call the metasemantics that allows demonstrations together with intentions
(limitedly) to secure the value of a demonstrative in context the hybrid account.
The hybrid account in effect inherits its difficulties from the demonstration and
intention accounts that it combines. First, like any account that invokes demonstra-
tions as an important part of the story as to how demonstratives secure values in
contexts, the hybrid account needs to address cases of the sort mentioned earlier
where it just isn’t clear what the demonstration is. That is, the account needs a theory
of demonstrations; and as I suggested above, there is reason to be skeptical that
a workable theory is forthcoming. Second, like the intention account, the hybrid
account seems to predict that speakers secure values for uses of demonstratives in
certain cases in which it seems implausible that they do. As we saw in discussing
the intention account, these are cases in which speakers have the relevant intentions
and either mount a poor demonstration or no demonstration. (Recall the example in
which I am at the San Clemente Ocean Festival looking north, with swarms of people
in sight; and Reimer’s () example of two people in a park filled with dogs, one of
whom the speaker recognizes as her dog Fido.) Again, it does not seem as though the
speaker succeeds in securing a semantic value for her demonstrative in such cases.
Reflection on how and why the three metasemantics for demonstratives I’ve been
arguing against are flawed suggests an alternative view. The view that the demon-
stration alone secures values for demonstratives was seen to be inadequate partly
because speakers often succeed in securing a value for a demonstrative even in cases
in which their demonstrations are “unclear”, and so cannot by themselves secure a
unique value (e.g. a vague gesture in the direction of a number of things); and even if a
demonstration is perfectly precise, it typically picks outmore than one thing (a dog, its
 Of course, a version of the hybrid account that requires a use of a demonstrative to be accompanied by
a demonstration would not have trouble with this last case. In fact, I believe that Kaplan () intended
the hybrid account to be understood in this way.
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coat, a flea, etc.). So something more or different is required. Speaker intentions, with
or without demonstrations, were seen to be inadequate as well because the resulting
view predicts that speakers secure values for demonstratives in cases in which they
intuitively do not.
Thinking about these latter cases suggests that the theories we have looked at err
in not requiring the speaker to do enough to secure a value for her demonstrative. In
the cases where the intention and hybrid accounts incorrectly predict that speakers
secure values for demonstratives, what drives the intuition that they really have not
is that their hearers don’t seem to have any way of knowing what the relevant values
are. Intuitively, the speaker failed to discharge her responsibility to be understandable.
This suggests that we should make it a requirement on securing a value for a demon-
strative in context that the speaker has discharged this responsibility and has made
her hearer able to determine what that value is. However, we don’t want to require
that the hearer in fact figure out what the relevant value is. That would be too strong.
If my hearer is inattentive, incompetent, or simply ignoring me, that should not by
itself prevent me from securing a value for my demonstrative. So I suggest we say that
the semantic value of a use of a demonstrative d in a context c is that object o that
meets the following two conditions: () the speaker intends o to be the value of d in
c; and () a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who knows the common ground
of the conversation at the time of utterance would know that the speaker intends o
to be the value of d in c. , We can abbreviate this by saying that an object o is the
semantic value of an occurrence of a demonstrative in context just in case the speaker
intends o to be the value and the speaker successfully reveals her intention. I’ll call
this metasemantics for demonstratives the coordination account., 
 I intend this in such a way that a single object must meet each of the two conditions (and not in
such a way that a single object meets both conditions, but e.g. more than one object meets one of the
conditions). Further, condition () talks of the common ground of the conversation at the time of utterance
and so presupposes that there is a unique common ground of the conversation at the time of utterance.
This means that the coordination account as sketched presupposes that the context is not defective (i.e. that
the presuppositions of the conversational participants are the same (or at least close enough to being the
same)).
 The requirement in condition () that an idealized hearer knows that o is the object the speaker intends
to be the value of her use of a demonstrative is designed to deal with cases in which the speaker intends o
and an idealized hearer would “accidentally” take the speaker to intend o. Josep Macia asks us to suppose
that I point to a picture of Ernie and say ‘He is smart.’ Unbeknownst to me, the frame holding the picture
is two-sided and there happens to be a picture of Ernie on the side I cannot see. Because of the way I am
situated with respect to the frame and my audience, a reasonable, attentive, competent speaker who knows
the common ground of the conversation would take me to intend to be pointing at the picture of Ernie
I am unaware of. In such a case I intend Ernie to be the semantic value of ‘He’ and an idealized hearer
would take me to intend Ernie. But such a hearer would not know I intend Ernie and so condition () is not
satisfied here. Hence Ernie is not the semantic value ofmy demonstrative in such a case on the coordination
account. Thanks to Josep Macia and Jason Stanley for discussion.
 Note that a speaker can successfully reveal her intention even though her hearer failed to figure out
what she intended. The hearer could be inattentive, incompetent, etc.
 See King () for ways in which wemight want to complicate the coordination account.
 Stephen Neale () uses two conditions similar to those in the coordination account to define a
notion of speaker reference (). Though the conditions Neale uses are similar to those in the coordination
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Note that on this view, demonstratives do not require an accompanying demon-
stration. Indeed, the coordination account sees demonstrations in a new light: a
demonstration is simply a means of revealing a speaker’s intention and so insuring
that condition () above is met. But a speaker need not reveal his intentions this way.
There are many other ways of revealing one’s intention and so meeting condition
(). If we both witness a loud explosion and I say ‘That was earshattering’, intending
to talk about the noise, condition () is bound to be satsified in the absence of a
demonstration. And so on the coordination account, the noise is the value of my
demonstrative. This kind of case highlights an advantage of the present view over
views on which demonstratives must be associated with demonstrations. As we saw,
such viewsmust give an account ofwhat the demonstration is in cases inwhich it is not
at all clearwhat the demonstration is or evenwhether therewas one, including the case
justmentioned aswell as those discussed earlier. By contrast, the coordination account
can simply deny that there are demonstrations in such cases. As long as conditions ()
and () are each satisfied by the same object in such cases, a value will be secured
despite the lack of a demonstration.
The coordination account avoids the other problems with the demonstration
account. Vague demonstrations or demonstrations that by themselves don’t determine
a unique object are no problem for the coordination account since it doesn’t claim that
demonstrations alone secure values for demonstratives. Again, on the coordination
account all demonstrations ever do when they accompany demonstratives is to help
with the satisfaction of condition () above. But other things may help too.
The coordination account avoids the problems with the intention account as well.
Recall that cases in which speakers have the relevant intentions but mount poor or
no demonstrations caused trouble for this account since it predicts that speakers
secure values for their demonstratives, whereas intuitively they do not. In cases of
this sort, some of which were described above, the coordination account says that
the demonstratives will not have values since condition () above will not be satisfied.
Finally, the coordination account avoids the problems of the hybrid account, since the
problems with that account were problems had by the demonstration and intention
account, it is important to see how different our views actually are. First, I reject the account of speaker
reference Neale characterizes using conditions similar to those used in characterizing the coordination
account. I favor an account of speaker reference on which the speaker’s reference in using an expression is
the object the speaker “intends to talk about” by means of the expression. I don’t believe anything about
hearers, idealized or otherwise, should be brought in here. Second, the coordination account is an account
of the semantic value of a use of an expression in a context. Neale makes clear that he rejects any notion of
the semantic value of a use of an expression in a context “unless such talk is taken to be straightforwardly
translatable into talk about things that speakers are doing” (). The way I understand the coordination
account, it is a robust account of the semantic value of the use of an expression in a context that won’t
be straightforwardly translatable into talk about what speakers are doing. Hence, Neale would reject it. In
short, Neale’s account of speaker reference and the coordination account are logically independent of each
other: neither entails the other. I reject his account of speaker reference and he rejects my account (and any
robust account) of the semantic value of the use of an expression in a context. Thanks to Stephen Neale for
helpful discussion.
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accounts; and we have seen that the coordination account avoids the problems with
those views.
I think of the fact that a speaker intends an object to be the value of an occurrence
of a demonstrative and the fact that a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer who
knows the common ground of the conversation would take the speaker to intend that
a certain object be its value to be objective features of a context of utterance. Call
the former the speaker fact and the latter the hearer fact. A context is appropriate
for a sentence containing demonstratives if each occurrence of a demonstrative in
it is associated with a speaker fact and a hearer fact and these facts “involve” the
same object (i.e. the intended object in the speaker fact is the object that would be
taken to be intended in the hearer fact). For a given occurrence of a demonstrative
in an appropriate context, call this latter object the coordinated object. Then I view
the meaning of a demonstrative as a function that maps an appropriate context to the
coordinated object. I take the latter to be the semantic value of the occurrence of the
demonstrative in the context. Finally, I take the lexical meanings of demonstratives
to require that a use of a demonstrative be supplemented by a speaker’s intention that
is recognizble by an ideal hearer in just the way that the demonstration account held
that the lexical meanings of demonstratives require that a use be supplemented by
a demonstration. Though demonstratives share this feature of their lexical mean-
ings, different demonstratives have other, different features of their lexical meanings
(e.g. ‘he’ has as part of its lexical meaning that its value in a context must be male, but
‘it’ does not; ‘that’ has as part of its meaning that the thing it is used to talk about is
distal, ‘this’ does not, etc.).
My defense of the coordination account has amounted to claiming that it gets the
intuitively correct results in a variety of cases. That is, it predicts that speakers secure
values for their demonstratives in cases in which that verdict seems intuitively correct;
and it predicts that speakers fail to secure values for their demonstratives in cases in
which that verdict seems intuitively correct. However, there are other considerations
in favor of the coordination account as well.
I mentioned above that one advantage the coordination account enjoys over
accounts that require demonstratives to be accompanied by demonstrations is that
accounts of the latter sort must tell some story about what the demonstration is in
cases in which speakers seem to successfully secure values for their demonstratives
 Or at any rate, this is so for demonstratives that refer. Recall that I don’t take simple or complex
demonstratives to be referring expressions, so the story is a bit different for them.
 We can now make more precise the sense in which supplementives require supplementation in con-
text to have semantic values in context in a way that pure indexicals do not. Pure indexicals have meanings
that are functions defined on all contexts (since all contexts have speakers, times and places), whereas the
meanings of supplementives are defined only on appropriate contexts. This means that a speaker using a
supplementive must do something (form the relevant recognizable intention) to insure that the context is
of a sort that the supplementive’s meaning is defined on.This latter is the required supplementation.Thanks
to Alexi Burgess for helpful comments here.
 Still other virtues of the coordination account are discussed in King ().
OUP CORRECTED PROOF–FINAL, //, SPi
the metasemantics of contextual sensitivity 
despite not appearing to mount demonstrations in any obvious sense. The coordina-
tion account can simply deny that there are any demonstrations in such cases and
claim that in these cases speakers reveal their intentions by other means.
A related advantage of the coordination account is that there is no puzzle at all about
cases of so-called deferred reference: cases in which one in some sense indicates one
thingwhile securing somedistinct thing as the value of the demonstrative. Supposewe
are in a graduate seminar. It is common ground that a participant, Glenn, is skiing at
Mammoth today and so couldn’t attend the seminar. It is also common ground that he
always sits in a now empty chair tomy right. Intending to say something about Glenn,
I point at the empty chair and say ‘I bet he is having fun right now.’ Since I intend
Glenn to be the value of my demonstrative and a competent, attentive, reasonable
hearer who knows the common ground of our conversation would take him to be the
object that I intend to be the value, the coordination account predicts that he is the
value of my use of the demonstrative.What cases of so-called deferred reference show
is that one can successfully reveal one’s intention to have o be the value of a use of a
demonstrative by demonstrating some object other than o. This is hardly surprising
given that speakers can even successfully reveal such an intention by demonstrating
nothing at all, as we have seen.
We now turn to the question of whether the coordination account can be applied to
the supplementives I mentioned at the outset. I am going argue that it clearly can be in
some cases andwill discuss whatwould be required to apply it to others, concentrating
on the case of gradable adjectives.
Let’s begin with relational expressions that take implicit arguments. In normal uses
of ‘Cindy is ready.’ it seems to me quite plausible that the coordination account gives
the correct view of how the implicit argument is supplied in context. For, first, it seems
plausible that speakers do intend specific implicit arguments when they felicitously
utter sentences like ‘Cindy is ready.’ Second, it seems plausible that if they lack such
intentions or if they fail to reveal their intentions, they will have failed to secure an
implicit argument. Third, it seems plausible that if the speaker does intend a certain
implicit argument and an idealized hearer who knows the common ground of the
conversation would see that the speaker intended it, then it is the implicit argument
supplied in context. In other words, speakers have the sorts of intentions the coordi-
nation account appeals to in using expressions that take implicit arguments. Further,
when the conditions the coordination account specifies are met, it seems plausible
that an implicit argument has been secured as a semantic value in context; and when
they are not met, it seems plausible that no implicit argument has been secured. That
is a good reason for thinking the coordination account applies here.
Exactly similar remarks apply in the case of quantifier domains and possessives. In
all these cases, then, the coordination account looks like a promising metasemantics
for the supplementives in question.
However, there is a phenomenon involving these expressions thatmightmake some
doubt my claim that the coordination account provides the correct metasemantics for
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them and that will make us look at the coordination account somewhat differently.
Consider quantifier domains as an example. The idea here will be that when I say
‘Every student passed’, there will be some property that I intend to further restrict the
domain and that an idealized hearer who knows the common ground of the conversa-
tionwould takeme to intend.This property is thenwhat does the further restricting.
In many cases things work this way and the coordination account applies neatly.
However, as many have pointed out, in some cases of uttering quantified sentences,
speakers probably have not formed an intention that picks out a single property to
further restrict the domain of a given quantifier. For example, I say ‘All the beer is in
the fridge.’ and there is a range of properties—being just bought by us, being just carried
in from the car by us and so on—such that it isn’t clear that I intended any one of them
or that an idealized hearer who knew the common ground of the conversation would
have taken me to intend any one of them. But then it may look like the coordination
account doesn’t apply here.
I am not sure exactly how to think of such cases theoretically. But even in this case,
I think I did have an intention that determined a certain range of properties. The
presence of such intentions is suggested by accompanying dispositions to respond
affirmatively or negatively when asked completions of the following: ‘Did you mean
the beer that . . . ?’ Similarly, an idealized hearer who knew the common ground of
the conversation would have taken me to have intended a certain range of properties.
One way to think of this theoretically is that I have in some sense put a bunch of
propositions in play—one corresponding to each property in the range—by intending
a certain range of properties and having revealed my intention. So here it seems
to me the coordination account applies in sort of a ‘loosened’ or generalized way. It
appears that the reason for allowing such looseness in this case is that conversational
purposes do not require me to use any particular property to further restrict the
quantification as long as I get you to attend to the beer I intend to talk about. What
seems to me to be a closely related phenomenon will be discussed further below,
where we will see that the phenomenon appears to arise with virtually all supple-
mentives (though perhaps it arises more frequently with some supplementives than
others).
This leaves us with gradable adjectives, modals and conditionals. I will only address
the case of gradable adjectives here but I think that modals, conditionals and other
supplementives raise similar issues. I hope to show what kinds of moves would have
to be made if the coordination account were to apply to gradable adjectives as well as
some other cases.
 I am being deliberately a bit vague here to remain neutral on the question of how the details of doman
restriction work (I am actually doing that with all the cases I am looking at except demonstratives). I am,
however, sympathetic to the sort of view Stanley and Szabo () defend.
 Gillies and von Fintel () have the notion of putting multiple propositions in play in uttering a
sentence containing an epistemic modal.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF–FINAL, //, SPi
the metasemantics of contextual sensitivity 
Michael Glanzberg () gives several arguments that gradable adjectives are not
governed by what he calls a direct metasemantics, though he does take other sup-
plementives, specifically demonstratives and what he calls thematic parameters, to be
governed by one. Glanzberg takes a direct metasemantics for a supplementive to be
one where its semantic value in context is determined by the speaker’s intentions.
That is, Glanzberg’s direct metasemantics is what I called the intention account. I have
argued that the coordination account is a better metasemantics for demonstratives
than the intention account; and Glanzberg’s arguments, if they worked, would show
that the coordination account is not the right metasemantics for gradable adjectives.
So henceforth in discussing Glanzberg’s account, I will just take his direct metase-
mantics to be the coordination account.Thus, I will reconstrue Glanzberg as allowing
that the coordination account applies to demonstratives and thematic parameters,
which include relational expressions taking implicit arguments, and arguing that the
coordination account does not give the correctmetasemantics for gradable adjectives.
Because it will be relevant to our discussion, I must sketch the semantics for
gradable adjectives that Glanzberg assumes, which is due to Christopher Kennedy
(). We will only be concerned with the positive form of gradable adjectives. On
Kennedy’s view, adjectives denote measure functions: functions that map individuals
to degrees (type <e,d>). These degrees are totally ordered with respect to some
dimension given by the adjectives meaning, yielding a scale. Adjectives combine with
degree morphology resulting in something that denotes a property of individuals. In
the positive form (‘is tall’), the degree morpheme is a null morpheme pos. Hence,
syntactically, the adjective with degree morpheme looks as follows:
() [DegP[[Degpos] [APtall]]]
The semantics for pos is: ||pos||c = λgλx.g(x) > s(g). s is determined in context and
will be a function from adjective meanings to degrees on the scale appropriate to the
adjective’s meaning (g ranges over adjective meanings; and x ranges over individu-
als). Thus ||[DegP[[Degpos] [APtall]]]||c = λx.tall(x)> s(tall). An individual o has
this property just in case the height tall assigns to o is greater than the height the
contextually determined function s assigns to tall.
The contextual sensitivity here is a result of the fact that the function s from adjec-
tive meanings to degrees on the scale given by tall must be determined in context.
I take it that Kennedy’s view is that the meaning of pos is such as to require sat-
uration in context by a function from adjective meanings to degrees. On this way
of understanding Kennedy, pos is the supplementive here. Thus if my coordination
account applies here, and if s is determined in context, the speaker must intend that
s be the value assigned to pos in the context; and an indealized hearer who knows
the common ground of the conversation must see that the speaker intends s to be the
 tall is the semantic value of ‘tall’.
 Here I am identifying people’s heights with degrees on the height scale.
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value. Glanzberg complains that this could not be so, because ordinary speakers and
hearers do not have intentions or thoughts about functions from adjective meanings
to degrees on the relevant scale.
I think Glanzberg is right that ordinary speakers do not have intentions that have
functions from adjective meanings to degrees as their objects. Indeed, Glanzberg
raises an important point here: if the coordination account is to apply to a given
supplementive, the values assigned to it in context must be such that it is plausible
that ordinary speakers have intentions regarding them. Hence, exotic, highly abstract
or mathematically sophisticated entities are ruled out as semantic values of a
supplementive in the mouths of ordinary speakers if the coordination account is
the correct metasemantics for that supplementive. The question this raises for
the coordination account is whether there is a plausible view along the lines of
Kennedy’s () on which the entity assigned to pos in context is something that
can be determined by the intentions of ordinary speakers, unlike the function s from
adjective meanings to degrees.
Before addressing this question, however, I want to distinguish the concern I am
discussing here from another that it could be confused with. I have heard people
claim that a certain semantic theory can’t be correct because the context independent
semantic values it assigns to expressions are ‘too complicated’ in some sense (typically,
formally/mathematically). That is not the worry being addressed here. The claim is
that, if the semantic value secured by a supplementive in context is so because the
speaker intended it to be the value, and an idealized hearer who knows the common
ground of the conversation would see that the speaker intended the relevant value,
then the value had better be something ordinary speakers intend in using the expres-
sion in question. Certain sorts of “formally sophisticated” values (e.g. functions from
adjective meanings to degrees) don’t seem to satisfy this condition. But this has no
import at all as far as I can see for the question of whether a semantics that assigns
“formally sophisticated” context independent semantic values to expressions is to be
faulted for doing so.
To return to themain theme, instead of the semantics for pos proposed by Kennedy
above, I propose the following: ||pos||c = λgλx.g(x) > dc, where dc is a degree on a
scale determined in context. In turn, ||[DegP[[Degpos] [APtall]]]||c = λx. tall(x)>
hc. I claim that the height hc is determined in context in accordance with the
 The restriction to ordinary speakers here is important since formal sophisticates can have a highly
abstract formal object be the semantic value of e.g. ‘that’ in a context. Further, even the claim about ordinary
speakers is qualified below.
 Thanks to Jason Stanley for helpful discussion.
 One of the reasons Kennedy () favored using the function s from adjective meanings to degrees
in the semantics of pos is that he thought the meaning of an adjective played some role in determining the
degree that something had to be above or below to have the adjective correctly apply. My thought is that
the meaning of the adjective can still play a role here by constraining what a competent speaker intends in
using the adjective in something like the way the meaning of ‘he’ constrains what a speaker can reasonably
intend (males!) in using ‘he’ and by constraining what an idealized hearer who knows the common ground
of the conversation would take the speaker to intend. I discuss this further below.
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coordination account. Suppose I am in a context c where I have a pretty clear intention
to count people six foot two and up as tall, and an idealized hearer who knew the
common ground of the conversation would see that I intended this. Then hc is six
foot two.
The account works here because we have identified heights with degrees on a scale,
and assumed speakers can have intentions about ‘cut off ’ heights for ‘tall’ in contexts.
So the speaker’s intentions determine a height degree very directly by being intentions
that have heights (numbers) as their objects. But what about other gradable adjectives
where speakers will not have intentions with numbers as their objects in using them,
as with, say, ‘smart’? Here I think we are going to have to say that the speaker has an
intention whose object determines a degree, with the result that the relation between
the intention and the degree is less direct than the relation between an intention and
the semantic value of a demonstrative or the semantic value of pos when combined
with ‘tall’. Suppose that in using ‘smart’ I intend that a certain kind of person as
regards intelligence provides the cutoff for being smart. People of that kind as regards
intelligence and anyone smarter count as smart. Call the kind of person I intend
here the object of my intention. Suppose an idealized hearer who knows the common
ground of the conversation would recognize my intention. I suspect when colleagues
and I discuss philosophers we think are smart this is the case. Since the kind of person
I intend has a degree of smartness, the object ofmy intention, and an idealized hearer’s
recognition of my intention, determine a degree of smartness in context. Here the
connection between the intention and the degree will be a little more indirect than in
cases where numbers just are the objects of my intention.
It is worth highlighting the two strategies that were employed in trying to respond
toGlanzberg’s argument that gradable adjectives are not governed by the coordination
account. First, we changed the alleged semantic value assigned in context from some-
thing that it did not seem could be the object of the intentions of ordinary speakers
in using gradable adjectives to something that it seems could be. In the case of ‘tall’
it was specific heights that are then degrees on a scale of tallness; in the case of
‘smart’ it was a certain kind of person as regards intelligence. Second, in the case
of gradable adjectives like ‘smart’ where it is implausible that speakers have numbers
as the objects of their intentions, we made the relation between the intentions of the
speaker and the semantic value assigned in context more indirect than it is in the case
of demonstratives or gradable adjectives like ‘tall’.
I emphasize these points because I suspect other caseswill require similar strategies.
Consider a case where the leading semantic theory of a given supplementive has it
taking on semantic values in context that don’t appear to be the sorts of things that
can be the objects of the intentions of ordinary speakers. Call such a case a recalcitrant
 Evidence that we have kinds of people in mind when using adjectives like ‘smart’is given by the fact
that if asked what I mean by ‘smart’ in a given case, I often start to articulate what kind of person as regards
intelligence I have in mind: ‘you know, she gets points quickly, makes good critical remarks, . . . ’.
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case.Then the current strategy for having the coordination account handle recalcitrant
cases is: make sure the objects of speakers’ intentions really are things they can have
intentions about and that hearers can have beliefs about (e.g. in the case of ‘tall’, we
swapped out s for hc). Call these the objects of the intentions. Then make sure the
objects of intentions determine the semantic values assigned to the supplementives in
context in some manner or other. I leave open the question of what other strategies
might be available for the coordination account in dealing with recalcitrant cases.
One thing to think about here is whether positing different sorts of speaker intentions
would help with certain cases. This would require thinking a lot more than I have
about the nature of intentions generally.
Let me now turn to why Glanzberg’s metasemantics for pos is in certain ways
unattractive. Actually, Glanzberg is up front about the fact that he really doesn’t have
a full blown account of the metasemantics for pos. He does say that a lot of things are
involved and that it will be messy. Glanzberg () writes:
I have argued for contextual parameters which require highly indirect metasemantics. What
fixes their values will be complicated combinations of such factors as what is salient in the envi-
ronment, speakers’ intentions, hearers’ intentions, coordinating intentions, linguistic meaning,
general principles governing context, discourse structure, etc. From these resources, values will
have to be computed. (: )
He also says:
A contextual parameter with an indirect metasemantics must be set by the various pieces of
information context provides, but context does not simply hand us a value for such a parameter,
nor does it hand us a uniform rule for computing the value from a specific piece of contextual
information. Rather, a range of contextual information and computational rules must be taken
into account and weighed in working out the value from context. (Glanzberg : )
So Glanzberg’s indirect metasemantics for certain parameters—again, Glanzberg’s
term for supplementives—is going to be extremely messy, involving as it does a
tremendous number of factors. But Glanzberg also thinks there is no uniform rule
by means of which these factors are weighed. Because of this, Glanzberg admits that
speakers and hearers often will be ignorant of or mistaken about what value has been
assigned to the supplementive in context (:  fn ). In turn this means that the
value that has been assigned to the supplementive plays no real role in communication
in such cases. Not much use having a value assigned to a supplementive if it plays no
role in communication! Further, I find it hard to believe that we would have evolved
a metasemantics for some supplementives that is this messy and non-uniform. What
would be the point, if the result was that we were often in the dark about what the
metasemantics delivers?
 I endorse some version of the planning theory of intentions of the sort Bratman defends but I haven’t
thought much about the details in the present case. Another thing to think about is the idea that certain
things are more eligible than others to be the objects of intentions and how that would play out here.
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Let’s turn to a second argument that Glanzberg gives against the view that grad-
able adjectives are governed by the coordination account. In the case of thematic
parameters and demonstratives, which according to Glanzberg are governed by a
direct metasemantics like the coordination account, Glanzberg thinks that the pres-
ence of the relevant intention is attested to by the fact that we can query what
the speaker intended and expect a sharp reply. Consider expressions that allow an
implicit argument, which Glanzberg takes to involve a thematic parameter, and
demonstratives:
I. A: John won.
B: What did John win?
A: The chess match.
II. A: She is smart.
B: Who?
A: Her/Cindy.
But in the case of gradable adjectives, Glanzberg claims, things are different. First,
there is no natural way to query the alleged intended standard, for example, for being
rich. Second, the response won’t be to offer a standard and is likely to be unhelpful
(‘You know, rich’ or ‘Well, kind of rich’). These alleged facts, Glanzberg thinks, show
that the relevant intention is simply not present.
Recall that on the view I am defending, in using gradable adjectives, speakers have
intentions regarding the “cutoff” for being tall or rich and these intentions, when they
would be recognized by idealized hearers, directly or indirectly determine degrees on
the relevant scales. It seems to me that in many cases, speakers clearly do have such
intentions in using gradable adjectives. When Obama and his cabinet are discussing
why they won’t extend tax cuts for the rich, and Obama includes himself as rich, he
very clearly intends that the cutoff point for being rich is making more than $,
per year and an idealized hearer would recognize his intention. $, can then just
be taken to be the degree on the scale above which people count as rich in this context.
Contrary to what Glanzberg claims, we can query someone about his intention in
this sort of case. After hearing Obama and not being attuned to his position on the
Bush tax cuts, I can query his intention by asking ‘How rich?’ Obama would, of
course, reply sharply by saying ‘anyone who makes over $, per year’. Similar
remarks apply to a case of US swim coaches at the Olympic trials saying ‘Missy was
fast in the  back this morning.’ Again here, they would have specific intentions
that determine degrees on the relevant scale (in this case, swim times), and idealized
hearers would recognize this. So contrary to what Glanzberg suggests, I think it is
clear that in many cases speakers will have intentions in using gradable adjectives
that determine degrees on the relevant scales, as shown by the fact that they can be
queried about their intentions and they can provide sharp replies about the relevant
standard.
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However, I think there is an element of truth to Glanzberg’s concern that in some
cases speakers do not have intentions determining specific degrees in using grad-
able adjectives, though I understand what is going on in such cases differently from
Glanzberg.This is related to the phenomenon I discussed above concerning quantifier
domains. It seems to me that speakers often use gradable adjectives in a “loose way”,
where they don’t have intentions that are specific enough to determine a unique
degree. I suspect that this is due to conversational purposes being different in such
cases than they are in the cases discussed above where specific intentions are present.
When Obama is talking about not extending tax cuts for the rich, conversational
purposes dictate that we have a very specific idea about who counts as rich. After all,
we are going to propose allowing taxes to rise for a group of people and claim that this
is a good idea. As such, we had better be clear about who is rich. Similarly, the swim
coaches are interested in exchanging information about swimming speed in a sport
where elite races are often decided by hundredths of seconds. But in normal conver-
sations in which only a low degree of precision is required or where the conversation
is quite casual, there is just no need for speakers to have very specific intentions about
who counts as rich, fast, or tall.
Of course, even in these cases speakers will have intentions that rule some things
out. When I told my wife the ocean was cold the other day, I certainly didn’t have an
intention that a water temperature of n degrees Fahrenheit or below counts as being
cold. But I certainly intended, for example, to rule out  degrees as being cold. It is
natural to think that in such cases speakers’ intentions determine a range of degrees
on the relevant scales. As in the case of quantifier domain restriction, my dispositions
to respond to completions of “Did you mean to count . . . degrees as cold?’ attest to
the presence of such an intention. And as in the case of quantifier domain restriction,
I won’t try to say how exactly to treat this phenomenon theoretically. Again, perhaps
we want to say that in some sense speakers are putting in play a bunch of propositions
involving the degrees in the range determined bymy intention. Or perhaps we should
spell things out in some other way. The point is that in these cases, where Glanzberg
sees no speaker’s intention that can play a role in determining degrees on a scale, I see
an intention that determines a range of degrees rather than a specific degree.
I have claimed that depending on conversational purposes, speakers’ intentions
sometimes determine a degree on a scale and sometimes merely determine a range of
degrees. This amounts to claiming that the supplementive in gradable adjective con-
structions sometimes gets assigned a unique semantic value in context and sometimes
gets associated with only a range of values (or perhaps we should say that the value is
the range). We saw above that a similar phenomenon occurs in the case of quantifier
domain restriction. It is important to see that this happens with what Glanzberg calls
thematic parameters and demonstratives aswell, where, again, Glanzberg agrees that a
direct metasemantics like the coordination account is the correct metasemantics. But
then by Glanzbergs own lights, these phenomena cannot preclude a direct metase-
mantics for the relevant expressions. Suppose I am surfing at LostWinds beach. South
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ofme are a bunch of other surfers. I keep seeing different surfers from the pack getting
incredible waves. I comment tomy buddy nodding to the south ‘Those guys are good.’
It seems doubtful that my intentions pick out a unique group of guys and it seems
doubtful that my buddy takes them to. I think the reason is that for the purposes of
our conversation, all that I am trying to or need to convey is that there are numerous
good surfers among the group to the south. So here my intentions, and the fact that
they would be recognized by an idealized hearer, determine merely a range of groups,
and hence potential semantic values, for the demonstrative.
Similarly, suppose Cindy has a troubled relationship with her mother, who is
thoughtless and bitter. Cindy and I visit her mother one day and the mother is clearly
in a foul mood. She immediately begins to berate Cindy about her not having a better
job, not beingmarried and so on. She also adjusts Cindy’s clothing and hair and offers
her lipstick and other makeup, clearly implying that she needs more makeup and
that her clothes are inappropriate. All the while she is swigging whisky and smoking.
At some point Cindy says ‘I’ve had enough.’ and walks out the door. Did Cindy’s
intentions at the time of utterance determine a single thing that she has had enoughof?
It seems clear that this need not be the case. It seems likely that she intended a range
of things that she has had enough of and an idealized hearer would recognize that.
So again we get recognizable intentions determining a range of potential semantic
values here.
We live in New York and are getting married in San Clemente, California. We are
discussing whether to have a New York firm cater our wedding or whether to have
some firm near where the wedding is do it. I say ‘Having a caterer from New York
would be a lot of hassle. Let’s just go with a local firm.’ In uttering this didmy intention
determine what the firm had to be local to? Again, it seems likely that there is a
range of locations determined by my intentions: San Clemente; the area consisting of
Dana Point to San Clemente; Southern Orange County, etc. So again my recognizable
intentions determine a range of potential semantic values.
I think we can even get something like this phenomenon with singular demonstra-
tives and pronouns. Here are three cases. Annie,Thony,Mary and I are in a restaurant
in Barcelona eating tapas. We have five on the table that we are eagerly sampling and
more are on the way. Annie says ‘This is so good.’ Must Annie have intended some
one thing as the semantic value of ‘This’ and would an idealized hearer who knows
the common ground of the conversation recognize that she did? It seems that there
are a range of things that Annie’s intentions leave open as candidates to be the seman-
tic value of ‘This’ here. A second case: suppose we are watching an air race with
 This example was inspired by a similar example Thony Gillies suggested to me to make a somewhat
different point.
 Thanks to Annie Papreck King for the example. I suspect that things in the range include themeal we
are now having, the food we are currently eating, four of the tapas we are currently eating (Annie thought
the pimientos de patron were a bit oily), and so on.
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binoculars. Planes are copiloted with each pilot having equal time piloting the plane.
We notice smoke coming from one of the planes and I say ‘He’s in trouble.’ Again here,
must I have intended one of the pilots or even the plane itself as the semantic value?
It seems not and it seems that both pilots and the plane are in the range of objects
determined by my intentions and an idealized hearer would recognize this. Third
example (real life case!). Annie has been trying to download someprinter drivers from
the HP website. She keeps getting an error message from the site. We tinker andmake
various changes and she tries it again. I yell down to her from upstairs ‘Did it give you
an error message?’ Did I intend for a unique thing to be the semantic value of ‘it’? No,
I didn’t. For my intention didn’t distinguish between Annie’s computer, its operating
system, the HP website, and so on. Again, it appears that my intentions determined
only a range of possible semantic values here and Annie no doubt recognized that.
Glanzberg’s final argument that the supplementive involved with gradable adjec-
tives isn’t governed by the coordination account metasemantics concerns a phe-
nomenon that, following Richard (), he calls accommodation and negotiation.
With gradable adjectives, Glanzberg thinks, sometimes we accommodate what we see
to be a speaker’s view about who counts as rich or tall and allow this to be entered
on the conversational record. However, when different speakers have different views
about this, sometimes the cutoff point is negotiated. Glanzberg (: ) claims
that a direct metasemantics like the coordination account is not consistent with this
accommodation and negotiation and that an indirect metasemantics of the sort he
suggests would allow it.
However, I think we do see accommodation and negotiation in cases in which we
have direct metasemantics even by Glanzberg’s lights. Consider the following case.
You are the boss of a large company and I am your next in command. Yesterday you
warned a habitually tardy employee, Alan, that he had better be at work before 
A.M. the next day. The next morning at exactly  A.M., we discover that Alan walked
through the front door of the company’s office building at : and is now making
his way up to his th floor office. At what we know to be exactly  A.M. standing in
front of Alan’s office, I say to you “As instructed, Alan arrived before  A.M. and he is
on his way to his office now.’ Peering into Alan’s office you say ‘As you can see, Alan
hasn’t arrived and it is  A.M. Youmust fire him.’ It appears that what is going on here
is that we are negotiating over the implicit argument for ‘arrived’. I want it to be the
office building and you want it to be Alan’s office. So there does seem to be negotiation
over the implicit argument. Of course, you also could have instead accommodatedmy
preferred implicit argument. But though we have accommodation and negotiation
over the implicit argument, even Glanzberg thinks that the metasemantics governing
such implicit arguments is direct. So the presence of negotiation and accommodation
over the value of a supplementive cannot show that it is governed by an indirect
 Note how strange it would be for you to ask me ‘Did you mean one of the pilots or the plane or . . . ?’
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metasemantics. Hence if this does occur in the case of gradable adjectives, that is
consistent with the coordination account being their metasemantics.
Indeed, givenwhat I said earlier, we should expect accommodation and negotiation
in the case of gradable adjectives. Accommodation will occur in a case where you
recognizemy intention that the cutoffpoint formyuse of ‘rich’ ismakingndollars, and
have no problemwith that. Here the coordination account predicts that n is the degree
of wealth required to be rich in this context. Further, if in using gradable adjectives
intentions sometimes only determine a range of degrees due to conversational pur-
poses as I suggested, and if the conversational purposes shift in such away as to require
more precision, and if conversational participants have diverging interests concerning
what degree gets selected, we would precisely expect there to be negotiation. Let me
hasten to add that I am not claiming that it is only in this sort of case that we would
expect negotiation if the coordination account is correct. But it is one kind of case
where we would expect it.
Now suppose my responses to Glanzberg are all correct. (Hold that thought!) It
is still true that the coordination account works a bit differently in the case of some
supplementives. As we saw, at least in the case of some gradable adjectives, the relation
between speakers’ intentions and the semantic value assigned to pos is more indirect
than in the case of demonstratives and relational expressions with implicit arguments.
So it may be that Glanzberg can argue that the metasemantics still works somewhat
differently in the cases of the two sorts of supplementives he alleges exist. In any
case, as I’ve said I think he makes a good overall case for the conclusion that is most
important to him: there are two importantly different kinds of supplementives.
 A lot will hinge on what to say about things like quantifier domain restriction, where I have argued
that the metasemantics works essentially in the same way as for demonstratives and relational expressions
with implicit arguments. That shouldn’t be for Glanzberg since the latter are one kind of supplementive for
him and the former are another.
 I have said that if the coordination account is to apply to gradable adjectives, we are probably going
to have to admit it works a bit differently in the case of at least some gradable adjectives (e.g. ‘smart’)
than it does in the case of demonstratives. I also wish to make clear that I think that there are probably
important differences in behavior between certain supplementives. For example, I think gradable adjectives
are sometimes used to draw people into a conversation about a certain topic. Suppose we are swimmers and
have amutual friend, Amy, who we both used to workout with and who we haven’t seen in a while.We were
both significantly faster thanAmywhenwe trained together. I say to you: ‘I swamwithAmy today. Boy she’s
getting fast.’ I may pause here and fully expect that since you won’t be sure exactly what standard of fastness
I am employing, you will reply with something like ‘Fast, really? Amy was pretty slow before. How fast are
we talking here?’This is a perfectly good way to get into a discussion about Amy’s swimming speed. I don’t
think there is an analogous phenomenon in the case of demonstratives (I can say ‘He’s brilliant, you know’
not making clear who I intend and fully expecting you to ask whom I am talking about. But this seems a
much more marked usage than that of ‘fast’ above). If the coordination account is to be applied across the
board, such differences in behavior will have to be explained in ways that are consistent with there being a
single metasemantics for supplementives. One promising avenue is that different supplementives are able
to serve different conversational purposes due to e.g. the kinds of lexical meanings they have, the purposes
served by the parts of speech they are etc. In the present case, for example, the meaning of ‘he’ is so thin
that it doesn’t serve much purpose to use it without doing what is required to secure a semantic value for it.
When I use ‘fast’ without having done so, I at least signal to you that I am going to talk about things’ speeds
by some standard of speed or other. So a topic has been initiated.
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Earlier I briefly touched on Kennedy’s () idea that the meaning of an adjective
plays a role in determining the standard associated with the use of that adjective
in context. As we have seen, Glanzberg (), with his indirect metasemantics
for some supplementives, thinks many features of the context of utterance may go
into determining the value of certain supplementives in context. Since many people,
including me, find some version of this idea plausible, it is worth noting that the
coordination account preserves it. On the one hand, the coordination account claims
that the value of a use of a supplementive s in context c is the entity o that satisfies the
following two conditions: (i) o is the object the speaker intends to be the semantic
value of the s in c; (ii) a reasonable, competent, attentive hearer who knows the
common ground of the conversation would know the speaker intended o to be the
value of s in c. So there is a sense in which only the intentions of the speaker and
what an idealized hearer would know the speaker to intend go into determining the
semantic value of a supplementive in context according to the coordination account.
However, many, many factors about the context of utterance, including the meanings
of the words the speaker is uttering, prior discourse, questions under discussion, etc.,
constrain what a speaker can reasonably intend to be the value of a use of a demon-
strative and determine that an idealized hearer who knows the common ground of the
conversation would know what the speaker intends. To take a very simple example,
recall the case of Glenn not being in a meeting of the graduate seminar and his empty
chair being demonstrated while I say ‘He is having fun now.’ Had it not been in the
common ground that Glenn always sits in that chair and that Glenn is skiing at Mam-
moth on the day in question, a speaker could not reasonably intend that Glenn be the
semantic value of ‘He’ in this context. Exactly similarly, that a reasonable, competent,
attentive hearer who knows the common ground of the conversation would know the
speaker intended Glenn in this case is determined in part by the fact that it is in the
common ground that Glenn always sits in the relevant seat and that he is atMammoth
today. Since many features of context in this way affect what reasonable speakers can
intend in using supplementives and what idealized hearers would know speakers to
intend, a large variety of features of context play a role in determining the semantic
values of supplementives in context. Hence, what the coordination account says about
a wide variety of factors about context playing a role in determining semantic values
of supplementives in context differs from Glanzberg’s indirect metasemantics only in
how themany factors affect the fixing of a semantic value in context. I think this should
be enough to placate those who think that a large number of features of contexts of
utterance are involved in the determining the semantic values of supplementives in
context. For according to the coordination account, they are!
One final point. David Lewis famously thought that mental properties are just very
complicated physical properties. But this raises a puzzle for him (Lewis : –).
 See footnote .
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Very complicated physical properties are often such that precisely because of their
enormous complexity, they are beyond our ken. However, we can think of and track
the physical properties that are mental properties. How? It is because we can some-
times have simpleways of thinking about properties thatmay be enormously complex.
In the case of the physical properties that aremental properties, Lewis thought that we
think of them as the properties that bear such and such causal relations to perceptual
input, behavioral output and othermental properties.Whether Lewis is right about all
this, I’ll leave for another time. However, his point plausibly applies here.The property
of being intended by the speaker and being recognized to be so by an idealized
hearer who knows the common ground is a very complex property. If we tried to
say what property it is in terms of discourse structure, question under discussion,
salient entities and so on, we probably couldn’t do it. However, when we think of the
property in terms of being intended by the speaker and recognized to be so by an
idealized hearer, we have no trouble thinking about and tracking this very complicated
property. This resolves the Lewisian style mystery in the present case.
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